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Why Do Markets Change? Some Conventionalist 
Considerations on the Stability and  
Dynamic of Markets 
Luka Jakelja & Florian Brugger ∗ 
Abstract: »Warum ändern sich Märkte? Einige konventionentheoretische Über-
legungen zur Stabilität und zur Dynamik von Märkten«. This paper wants to de-
velop a dynamic approach of markets. We take the economics of conventions 
(EC) as the basic theoretical framework and expand it regarding concepts, 
which help to answer the question under which circumstances markets are ei-
ther (persistently) stable or (radically) dynamic. We introduce EC as a European 
research program focusing on uncertainty as the fundamental problem on 
markets. Then we develop the concept of market regimes to draw on some 
main pillars of the EC and at the same time to focus attention more, as it is 
usually the case, on the question why conventions are stable and why they 
change. We argue that usually markets are relatively stable; however, crises, 
exogenous factors, and divergent interpretations of quality on the individual 
level (dissatisfaction/critique of key actors) lead to change of conventions and 
consequently changing market regimes. Analytically, the existing regime fails to 
overcome uncertainty and establish market coordination. The empirical part of 
the paper illustrates the theoretical concepts with the case of a regional wine 
market where radical change led to the fall of the market convention and the 
rise of the domestic convention. 
Keywords: Market dynamics, market stability, economics of convention, quality 
conventions, market change, critique, innovation, uncertainty, market crises, 
Styrian wine market. 
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1.   Introduction1 
The “economics of convention” (in short EC) is an interdisciplinary research 
program that centers on the concept of conventions to develop a rich approach 
to (economic) processes on markets and in organizations and in society as a 
whole. Actors in the framework of EC possess interpretative rationality and the 
capacity for critique/judgment. The inherent uncertainty of situations poses the 
problem of coordination between actors. Value and worth depend on social 
processes and mechanisms, while certain knowledge is performative. Further-
more, the EC assumes a fundamental plurality of conventions and at the same 
time considers conventions and institutions to be imperfect (Eymard-Duvernay 
et al. 2010; Diaz-Bone and Thévenot 2010; Thévenot 2001). The question of 
change however, has so far not gained an appropriate focus within the EC. 
Although there is empirical work, which explicitly or implicitly relates to the 
EC and shows that conventions change, the question of how they change is 
much less prominent.  
Several contributions (see Ponte 2016) in the sociology of agriculture and 
food markets highlighted the general “quality turn” that was visible in many 
food markets in the last decades. Their main argument is that the culture or 
ethics of food consumption changed towards ecological sustainability, region-
ality, organic food, and animal rights. On many food markets there was a shift 
from the predominance of the efficiency based, functional and scientific mass 
production of the industrial convention towards a different view of quality and 
the tradition, familiarity, and trust centered relations and artisan demand specif-
ic handcraft of the domestic convention (for an overview of different quality 
conventions see Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Ponte and Gibbon 2005; or 
Ponte 2016). 
Similar developments are visible for the Styrian2 wine market. In the early 
1980s, the market convention dominated the market. Wine was considered as 
an “ordinary” basic consumption good. Prices were the main factor of distinc-
tion and the decisive coordination mechanism on the market. Increasing output 
was the main goal of wine producers. Ten years later the Styrian wine market 
looked quite different. Dominated by the domestic convention, quality rather 
than prices became the main factor of distinction. Rather than cheap wines, 
regional, high quality, artisanally produced wines were in demand. Under-
                                                             
1  This work was supported in part by funds of the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture. For 
helpful remarks on a prior version of the text, we are thankful to Klaus Kraemer, Sebastian 
Nessel, Barbara Ratzenböck, Sandra Pfister, Julian Flores, Jakob Gasser, Bernhard Siegl, and 
Nico Tackner." 
2  Styria is a region in the south-east of Austria. In particular the south and the east of Styria 
are among the main Austrian wine hotspots.  
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pinned by various intermediaries and institutions the domestic convention was 
widely accepted in the 1990s, so much so that little indicated that ten years 
before the first followers of the new convention were considered as “weirdos” 
and faced much mockery. 
Rather than simply describing the shift of the Styrian wine market, using the 
main concepts of EC we develop a heuristic of market change and stability. For 
the greater part, economics and (economic) sociology have both focused on 
static and structural conceptualizations of markets. Applications focusing on 
market dynamics are rare.  
We argue that markets neither change recurrently like suggested by many 
economists of the Austrian School of Economic Thought nor are they always 
stable as neoclassics (implicitly) suggests. Markets are usually relatively stable 
social orders, which occasional undergo radical changes. Therefore, a heuristic 
helping to understand and analyze market development should account for 
both: The usual stability and occasionally radical change of markets. 
We proceed as follows: In the next part (Section 2), we introduce the con-
cept of convention and the notion of uncertainty as a central problem in eco-
nomic sociology. In the next step (Section 3), we develop our concept of mar-
ket regimes and outline our understanding of markets and markets’ main actors. 
Then, we discuss market stability and change in the context of the EC. We 
outline mechanisms that maintain the status quo and mechanism that may break 
up stability and cause radical changes of markets (Section 4). By drawing on 
empirical material derived from qualitative interviews conducted with the main 
market intermediaries of a regional wine market, we illustrate our theoretical 
framework by the case of a market, which underwent radical change. Using the 
empirical material, we show the historical development and change on the 
market by examining how the market convention was replaced by the domestic 
convention (Sections 5 and 6). 
2. Uncertainty and Conventions 
According to Beckert (2009, 248) the central question of market sociology is 
“How is it that economic production and distribution can be successfully orga-
nized through markets?” Despite billions smooth daily market interactions, 
from an analytical perspective the frequency and stability of market relations 
seems surprising. Market interactions and outcomes are by nature uncertain, 
which makes stable relations and social orders unlikely in principle. Knight 
(1921) and Keynes (1921) distinguish risk and uncertainty: A situation is risky 
if mathematical likelihoods of different outcomes are definable. In contrast, 
uncertainty means that neither likelihoods nor possible outcomes are clear. 
Considering markets to be characterized by various uncertainties, for Beckert 
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(2009, 245) “markets are highly demanding arenas of social interaction, which 
can only operate if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved”: The 
value problem (the uncertainty about the value of goods and services), the 
problem of competition (frequently changing and excessive competition com-
plicates planning), and the cooperation problem (market participants’ uncer-
tainty about others action aggravates coordination).  
Defining uncertainty on markets as the crucial problem (Eymard-Duvernay 
et al. 2010, 2) various approaches developed different arguments about how 
market participants overcome uncertainty. Following Harrison C. White (1981) 
many contributors (Baker 1984, 1990; Burt 1983, 1992; Granovetter 1985; 
Podolny 2001; Uzzi 1997) argue that markets’ social embeddedness in net-
works reduce uncertainty and facilitate coordination. Others added further 
forms of market embeddedness: like “cognitive,” “cultural,” “structural,” and 
“political embeddedness” (DiMaggio and Zukin 1990).  
Institutional approaches (Carruthers and Halliday 1998; Dobbin 1997; 
Fligstein 1996, 2001; Powell and DiMaggio 2008) highlight how institutions 
facilitate coordination and cooperation and reduce uncertainty by creating a 
collective general frame enabling actors to form robust expectations, about 
others’ actions and the general functioning of markets (Aspers and Beckert 
2017; Fligstein 2001, 27). 
While network approaches and neo-institutional approaches dominate the 
Anglo-Saxon sociological contributions, conventionalist approaches received 
more attention in continental Europe; in particular in France. In contrast to 
network and institutional approaches the “economics of convention” (EC) 
offers an alternative theory of markets and market interaction that puts conven-
tions and conventional arrangements at the center.  
Similarly the question of how uncertainty is reduced and coordination and 
cooperation on markets succeeds are the main topics of EC (see Diaz-Bone and 
Thévenot 2010; Jagd 2007; Knoll 2013, 2015; Salais and Storper 1992; Wagner 
2001). According to EC “coordination between economic agents takes place 
within a context of pervasive uncertainty with respect to the actions and expec-
tations of others” (Salais and Storper 1992, 171), which makes stable social 
orders quite unlikely in principle (Bogusz 2010, 9). For the EC, market partici-
pants are uncertain about: the value and quality of goods, processes, and per-
sons; and about market specific forms of desirable and undesirable, legitimate 
and illegitimate actions. 
For Eymard-Duvernay et al. (2010, 6) overcoming uncertainty “is the daily 
bread of life in communities and […] societies.” However, unlike network 
approaches or institutional approaches EC assumes that uncertainty is reduced 
by “conventions [that] emerge as response to such [pervasive] uncertainty” 
(Jagd 2007, 78). Conventions are generally shared interpretations of the world 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2007; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) establishing a 
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collective frame enabling actors to evaluate and coordinate situations (Diaz-
Bone et al. 2010, 4) and give meaning to everyday situations (Thévenot 2007). 
Conventions “constitute culturally established resources for the coordination 
applied by actors in order to interpret situations and to evaluate persons, ob-
jects, processes to achieve a common goal” (Diaz-Bone 2012, 70). 
3. Market Regimes and Conventions 
Despite extensive sociological research on markets, general categorizations of 
different market types or regimes are rare. White (1981) distinguished between 
three basic conditions or types of markets: grind, paradox, or unstable crowded. 
His categorization is based on exogenously given market-specific relations 
between production costs and consumption utility on the one hand and quality 
costs and quality utility on the other. Alternatively, Aspers (2005) distinguishes 
status markets (where social status is of central importance) and standard 
markets (where status has little influence). For Lucien Karpik’s (2010) 
approach the properties of the goods themselves are the criterion of 
classification. 
Contributors in the tradition of the EC frequently distinguish markets along 
applied conventions. Enriching White’s (1981) market model with the 
fundamental assumptions and concepts of the EC Favereau, Biencourt and 
Eymard-Duvernay (2002) view market regimes along dominant conventions. 
Storper and Salais (1997, 33) distinguishing four ideal-typical “Worlds of 
Production.” “The Interpersonal World,” “the Market World,” “the World of 
Intellectual Resources,” and “the Industrial World” consist of specific 
production, organization, coordination, and distribution logics, which are 
orientated on a specific convention. Several EC contributors suggested that 
markets or market segments are characterized by one dominant convention 
(Diaz-Bone 2007, 498; Diaz-Bone and Thévenot 2010, 6). Empirical studies 
highlight that markets are often subdivided into segments dominated by 
different conventions (Boisard 2003; Diaz-Bone 2005). 
We argue that markets are characterized by market regimes. Market regimes 
are market specific combinations of conventions and institutions. In contrast to 
economic- and sociological-neo-institutionalism and following the EC 
mainstream we distinguish between institutions and conventions (for the EC 
view on intuitions see Diaz-Bone 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014; Wagner 1994; Bessy 
2002, 2012; Bessy and Favereau 2003). According to the EC institutions are 
dispositives facilitating coordination. However because the interpretation, use, 
and meaning of institutions are open, conventions enable actors to give 
institutions a collective meaning and interpretation in different situations (Diaz-
Bone 2012, 69-70). Because actors are able to use various conventions for a 
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pragmatic handling of institutions, depending on the applied convention the 
same institutions may be interpreted, used, and understood quite differently 
(Diaz-Bone 2009). It is assumed that both institutions and conventions, and the 
relation between them, determine actors’ interpretation of situations and their 
behavior. Therefor, we consider market regimes to comprise of institutions 
important for the specific market or market segment and conventions used by 
market participants to interpret and use institutions and to evaluate products, 
actors, and techniques. Quite important for our heuristic, outlined below, is that 
the relation between institutions and conventions may be harmonic or 
conflicting and may change over time. In the case of a harmonic relation, 
institutions and conventions often support and stabilize each other: 
Conventions may function as a normative fundament of institutions and 
therefore legitimize the institutional setting. The other way around dominant 
conventions, in one way or another, institutionalize. The institutionalization of 
dominant conventions further strengthens their hegemony; while a harmonic 
relation between institutions and conventions stabilize markets and market 
regimes a conflicting relation is a major reason for radical innovations and 
fundamental market dynamics; as outlined in more details below.  
In addition to the market regime, markets comprise, at least, three actors: at 
least, two producers and one consumer or the other way around. In addition to 
producers and consumers usually markets contain intermediaries (Beckert 
2010, 609). Intermediaries are organizations, which are neither producers nor 
consumers, nor institutions; they provide information, education, organization 
of actors and offer value assessments of “goods, individuals and organizations” 
(Bessy and Chauvin 2013): like educational organizations, the media, and 
interest groups. Intermediaries are in-between producers and consumers: Some 
may be closer to producers others are more related to consumers. 
Conventions support and facilitate actions (Dodier 2010) by constructing 
shared imaginations of how thinks should be (Diaz-Bone and Thévenot 2010, 
5). Conventions are general logics, shared grammars, which facilitate the 
collective valuation and classification of objectives and actors; the selection of 
production processes, equipments, and distributing strategies; and function as 
price formation and organization forms (Diaz-Bone 2007, 496-7). Shared 
conventions enable actors to form expectations about the future and others’ 
actions, and function as road maps of desired and undesired, legitimate and 
illegitimate actions. Hence conventions are mechanism to overcome 
uncertainty in situations where coordination is necessary (Diaz-Bone 2009, 
237), are “guides for actions” and “collective systems to legitimize” actions, 
they are “reciprocal expectations about the behavior of others” (Ponte 2016, 13). 
Market regimes provide a shared, generally known, complex system of 
valuations, of statements about desired and undesired, legitimate and 
illegitimate, permitted and prohibited actions. For example market regimes 
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specify desired and undesired forms of production and distribution (Storper and 
Salais 1997), what quality is and how it is generated (Eymard-Duvernay et al. 
2010), legitimate intermediaries and their decisions (Bessy and Chauvin 2013; 
Karpik 2010), and define desired and undesired forms of consumption and 
relations between the market participants. As a shared grammar market regimes 
offer orientation to producers which forms of production, used techniques and 
distribution are desired and undesired, permitted and prohibited in the specific 
market segment and how it transfers into quality and prices. It offers to 
consumers a yardstick to value and interpret quality and orientation about 
desired forms of demand and consumption and how these transfers into status 
and reputation. Market regimes provide orientation to intermediaries about 
desired and undesired, legitimate and illegitimate ways to enforce interests. 
Market regimes transform a wide range of possible actions, investments, 
education, knowledge, goods, etc., into market opportunities. By transferring 
possible actions into “single currency” known to all market participants, market 
regimes reduce uncertainty, and facilitate cooperation and coordination. 
4.  Statics and Dynamics of Market Regimes 
Despite the growing interest in markets in general, sociological contributions 
regarding market dynamics are scarce. Capitalist dynamics was a core topic of 
the early “economic sociology” at the late 19th and early 20th century. Max 
Weber, Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, or Karl Polanyi intensively analyzed 
the dynamic of capitalist societies. Since then the analysis of capitalism, and in 
particular its dynamic development, fell back behind new trend topics in sociolo-
gy. More recently some authors (Beckert 2014, 2009; Deutschmann 2012; Dosi 
et al. 2009; Nelson and Winter 1996; Scherer 2012) re-raised the issue of capi-
talist dynamics. However, the dynamics of capitalism in general and of markets 
in particular is still a marginal issue in contemporary (economic) sociology. 
4.1   Usually Stable, Occasionally Changing 
Traditionally we find two opposing general views on markets’ stability and 
dynamic. The first, the static view, dominates neoclassical economics and most 
of the new market sociology. Explicitly or implicitly, the representatives of the 
static view assume that markets are in equilibrium or at least tend towards 
equilibrium. Recognizing the possibility of (exogenous) interrupting shocks, 
which disturb the equilibria, usually it is assumed that eventually markets re-
turn to equilibria.  
In sharp contrast to static views, dynamic approaches consider capitalist 
markets as restless and immanently dynamic by nature. Dynamic approaches 
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were particularly advocated and developed by contributors of the Austrian 
school of economics. Inspired by Marx, for the “Austrians,” the main charac-
teristic of capitalist economies is their immanent dynamic evolution, which is 
why they fiercely criticized the neoclassical approach. For Schumpeter (1939, 
1942) the recurrent sequences of innovation and imitation and for Hayek 
(1945) the steady production of new knowledge cause the never-ending dynam-
ic evolution of capitalist markets. 
However, empirically both views seem unsatisfactory: Markets are usually 
relatively stable social orders, which occasionally undergo more or less radical 
changes. Hence, most of the time markets are well-functioning arenas of social 
interaction as mechanism succeed to reduce uncertainty and facilitate coordina-
tion. Nevertheless, occasionally markets face deep crises and undergo funda-
mental changes. Thus, a theory of market development should account for 
both: the usual stability and occasional fundamental change of markets. 
Whether markets are considered as immanently dynamic or rather stable 
strongly depends on how stability and change is defined. The Austrian school 
considers the introduction of new products, changing applied technologies, and 
the creation of new knowledge as innovations that change markets. In contrast, 
from the neoclassical perspective, change means fundamental shifts in the 
market structure. We focus on changes that shift market regimes: Hence, situa-
tions in which dominant conventions and the institutional setting – the market 
regime – are overthrown. 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012, 13) distinguish between radical and less far-
reaching changes: “it is useful to separate out the dramatic changes that occur 
in the formation and transformation of a field from the more piecemeal changes 
that result from contention in fields on an ongoing basis.” Likewise Argyris 
and Schön (1978) distinguish between Single-Loop and Double-Loop-Learning 
as reactions on the mismatch between goals and outcomes. The former de-
scribes the adaption of action only, the latter more fundamental adjustments 
like the transition of the guiding principles. Similarly we differentiate between 
normal and radical innovations. Normal innovations include all changes like 
the introduction of new products, new techniques, the appearance of new pro-
ducers, consumers and intermediaries that do not affect the underlying market 
regime. Normal innovations occur within the boundaries of the dominant mar-
ket regime leaving the underlying market regime unchanged. In contrast, radi-
cal innovations shift the underlying market regime. While normal innovations 
frequently occur, radical innovations are rare. 
4.2   The Stability of Market Regimes 
Why are markets usually relatively stable? Just remember that stability means 
here the absence of radical innovations. So why are radical innovations rela-
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tively unlikely? We develop three main arguments why market regimes are 
usually relatively stable. First, market regimes are usually successful in reduc-
ing uncertainty and facilitating coordination and cooperation. Second, market 
participants invest in market regimes; radical innovations devaluate, at least 
partly, these investments. Third, market regimes create “winners” and “losers.” 
Market regimes evaluate products and actors: Some actors and products receive 
a high value or status – “winners” – others a lower one – “losers.” Radical 
innovations question and shape the position of “winners” and “losers,” which is 
why usually “winners” have a very good reason to prevent radical innovations.  
Once established and acknowledged by market participants, market regimes 
reduce uncertainty, facilitate coordination and cooperation and therefore make 
stable market interactions possible. Orientating their actions on the same mar-
ket regime enables participants to form expectations about others’ actions and 
the future. Disturbances of established market regimes increase uncertainty and 
complicate coordination and cooperation. During times of change market par-
ticipants are uncertain about their own and objectives value and status or more 
generally about the valid system of valuation, about the logic of others’ action 
and the future in general. The increasing uncertainty hampers coordination and 
cooperation as participants lose a shared orientation. Because market partici-
pants have a strong vested interest in stable relations and social orders on mar-
kets, which allows them to form expectations on others’ action and the future, 
they are usually critical of radical innovations. 
Producers, intermediaries, and consumers invest in the established market 
regime. Investments include production technologies, skills, education, and 
distribution channels, etc. Intermediaries invest in programs, offered services, 
and political strategies and consumers invest in knowledge about the market 
and market goods in accordance to the established market regime. Take for 
example the domestic convention: It favors family businesses and crafts enter-
prises with close personal ties to consumers. Excellence regarding the craft, 
tradition, personal experience, personal relations between producers and con-
sumers and trust are the key orientations to evaluate quality (c.f. Diaz-Bone 
2018, 150-1, 162). Producers invest in traditions, handcraft, artisan excellence, 
technologies that allow for little division of labor, small quantities, and singu-
larity and distribution channels that intensify personal relations to consumers. 
Because information predominately consists of oral stories (Diaz-Bone 2018, 
152) consumers invest in stories, in knowledge about desired production and 
distribution forms, in personal networks with producers and more generally in 
information about the specific system of valuation. Intermediaries invest in 
services for producers like education courses for artisan, traditional production, 
and for consumers about the “right” way of goods valuation; in media and 
medial presentation of goods and market participants compatible with the do-
mestic convention. A radical innovation like the shift from the domestic con-
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vention to the industrial convention would amortize most of producers’, con-
sumers’, and intermediaries’ investments.  
David Dequech (2013) offers a set of explanations for conformity with insti-
tutions and consequently not occurring innovations. He sees coordination, the 
lack of power and/or resources, uncertainty, imitation, the role of social sanc-
tions, the perception of institutions as natural and inevitable and the legitimacy 
of institutions as reasons for conformity in different institutional contexts. 
Especially the role of legitimacy is interesting, because criticism of institutions 
and therefore their illegitimacy, as will become clear in the next section, is a 
crucial argument for change within the framework of the EC. 
As mentioned, market regimes create winners and losers. As in other 
“fields” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 94-115) or “strategic action fields” 
(Fligstein and McAdam’s 2012, 14) market regimes are structures that distrib-
ute better and worse field positions, in the form of status and product prices, to 
actors. According to Bourdieu (1993, 73) those with the good field position 
usually follow “conservation strategies” or tend to “orthodoxy.” In the same 
manner Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue that “incumbents” notoriously 
protect the status quo. Following the EC and distinguishing between critic and 
justification (Knoll 2017, 156-7) those with good market positions use their 
means to justify the status quo; hence to justify the dominant convention. 
Therefore, fearing that radical innovations would corrode their hegemony and 
favorable position market leaders have a strong vested interest to use their 
means to protect the status quo. 
The first point we state above is that any given constellation of institutions 
and conventions, of intermediaries, consumers and producers on a market of-
fers some kind of reduction of uncertainty, coordination and cooperation. In 
other words, a market regime always offers some minimal degree of order.  
In EC, André Orléan (2014) refers to René Girard and introduces mimetic 
behavior in his critical discussion of neoclassical theory. Imitation of others 
becomes a mechanism disrupting the neoclassical view that prices adjust in a 
manner leading to equilibrium. Considering fashion for example, imitation can 
lead to a situation where rising prices lead to a higher quantity of products sold. 
That is, the demand function has a positive slope. This of course, turns neoclas-
sical economics upside down. In Orléan’s view, imitation is a key mechanism 
for conventions. Mimetic behavior establishes and stabilizes conventions on 
markets with according prices, which are not the same as the price vector of 
general equilibrium theory. When it comes to the distinction of quality conven-
tions, the neoclassical market itself is actually a convention different from, for 
example, the regard convention (where fame and status play a crucial role for 
determining prices). As Orléan notes, for neoclassical economics this is already 
a dynamic market situation. However, within the context of EC, imitation leads 
 HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  170 
to stability of conventions. As will become evident in the next section, the 
capacity of the individual for critique is a main aspect of changing conventions. 
4.3   The Dynamics of Market Regimes 
In the last decades, several conventional contributions studied the shift of con-
ventions on various agricultural markets (Ponte 2016): Cidell and Alberts 
(2006 looked at the changing definitions of quality at the chocolate market; 
others studied shifting conventions in markets like Sánchez-Hernández et al. 
(2010) for the wine market in Castile and Leon, Stræte (2004) for the dairies 
market in Norwegian, Murdoch and Miele (1999) for the eggs and organic 
meat market in Italy, and Lindkvist and Sanchez (2008) compared the Spanish 
wine market with the Norwegian market for salt fish. 
Delivering very interesting results those studies use the theoretical frame-
work of the EC to analyze, but are much less interested in discussing their 
approach and findings theoretically. Most contributors show empirically how 
specific markets’ dominant conventional shifted, without developing theories 
or heuristics of conventional dynamics. Hence, those studies hardly outline 
how conventional change does fit into the EC theory and may be understood 
from the perspective of the EC. In addition, most studies take a high macro 
perspective and are focused on the description of the “old” and “new” status 
quo, which is why they usually ignore processes at the micro- and meso-level 
and more generally conflicts and adjustments during the process of change. In 
contrast to those studies, we try to develop a heuristic of market dynamic, 
which uses the main concepts of the EC and focuses particularly on the process 
of change. 
Above we outlined several mechanisms that maintain the status quo. Radical 
innovation need to overcome mechanism maintaining the status quo to be suc-
cessful. Below we identify several forces, which oppose the status quo and 
occasionally are strong enough to overcome it. We argue that particularly the 
coincidence of several forces, market participants’ dissatisfaction with the 
status quo, exogenous factors, and market crises may overcome the mechanism 
maintaining the status quo and cause radical innovations. 
The possibility of regime change is constituted in EC’s pragmatist action 
theory. According to EC, actors possess the ability to interpret and reflect con-
ventions in the light of specific situations and circumstances. Actors are aware 
of alternative conventions and have the ability to interpret and to reflect the 
appropriateness of conventions (Diaz-Bone 2010, 183). For the EC, actors are 
“interpretative rational” in the sense that actors are able to evaluate situations 
and conventions and the appropriateness of conventions for the given situation. 
Because actors are aware of alternative conventions, they are principally able to 
imagine a world different from the status quo; hence, a market regime different 
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from the established one. The ability to imagine alternative market regimes 
entails the possibility of criticism and regime changes; these two figures are 
central to the EC (Knoll 2013, 2017). However, the question appears: where 
does critique comes from?  
A permanent source of criticism emerges from the unequal distribution of 
market opportunities, between those with the better and the worse market posi-
tion. The unequal distribution of market opportunities is a permanent source of 
possible conflicts between those benefiting from the adscript market position 
and those with the worse position expecting that alternative regimes may raise 
the value of their attributes value their attributes. Actors with less favorable 
market positions have a strong vested interest in attacking the status quo and 
shifting the market regime. 
Apart from materialist reasons, conventions face idealistic critiques as con-
ventions represent a specific “sense of justice” (Thévenot 2011, 113) that does 
not always fit the ideal and ethical concepts of market participations and the 
market environment. In many sociological studies, shifting ideas are considered 
as the main reason for changing conventions. For example, according to several 
contributors, the “quality turn” in agricultural markets was induced by shifting 
consumption ethics and the rise of new ideas about wealth and justice. Authors’ 
main argument is that the increasing demand for organic, regional, fair trade 
goods, which was closely connected with the rise of new ideas about environ-
mental sustainability, consumer responsibility, animal rights and so on, shifted 
many markets from industrial conventions toward domestic and ecological 
conventions (see Barrientos and Dolan 2006; Murdoch and Miele 1999; Ponte 
2016). 
Material and ideal critique on market regimes often remains weak, segregat-
ed and local and hardly challenges the status quo. The critique of those with 
lower market positions and idealistic outsiders is often rejected by the majority 
of the market participants as criticism of “losers” and “idealistic weirdos.” 
However, occasionally critique spreads, accelerates, and reaches former sup-
porters of the established market regime. Criticism spreads as market partici-
pants demand the orientation on alternative ideas, like for example consumers 
demand for organic food; if market regimes are increasingly considered as 
unable to reduce uncertainty and facilitate cooperation and coordination; and if 
market regimes are blamed to cause crises and bad perspectives for the mar-
ket’s future. 
However, even if criticism accelerates and spreads frequently it remains in-
effective, local, and segregated. Market regimes may survive just because 
critics fail to agree on one alternative and to organize and coordinate their 
attacks. As more and more former supporters or silent “acceptors” of the mar-
ket regime defect to the critics’ camp, radical innovations become more likely, 
but at the same time also the likelihood increases that the camp of critics splits 
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up into competing subgroups. Rather than causing radical innovations, raising 
criticism often leads to chaos and the return to the old regime. The subdivision 
of the critical camp is one of the main reasons why promising upraises fail. 
Successful “revolutions” are usually preceded by a canonization and bundling 
of local criticism. In particular “protest movements,” which unite behind “char-
ismatic leaders” and attract actors with the ability to reach a wide audience, 
have a good chance to be successful. Weber, Heinze and DeSoucey (2008) 
show how the positive reporting of highly respected and widely known journal-
ists helped to develop a market for grass feed beef. Ferguson (1998, 2006) 
highlighted the crucial importance of culinary discourses, the rising interests of 
writers, journalists, and intellectuals for culinary topics, for the development of 
the French “haute cuisine” in the 19th century. 
Usually inner criticism is underpinned and fueled by external factors. Vari-
ous influences may be considered as exogenous: institutional changes, influ-
encing conventions of neighboring fields, or scandals and crises in other mar-
kets. Much attention was given to the importance of value and production 
chains for the choice of conventions (see Gwynne 2006; Ponte 2009; Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005; Sánchez-Hernández et al. 2010). The main argument is that 
globally, nationally, and regionally “conventions spread all along the value 
chain” (Sánchez-Hernández et al. 2010, 421). Institutional change is another 
main reason for radical innovations and among the most effective external 
factors. Several studies (Barbera and Audifredi 2012; Garcia-Parpet 2007; 
Weik 2016) have shown how institutional change initiated from outside, like 
new transnational regulations and quality laws, caused shifts in dominant mar-
ket conventions. 
The third main impulse for radical innovations is deep crises. Deep crises 
and big scandals shatter markets and may cause radical innovations. Crises and 
scandals question the legitimacy of the market regime and usually strengthen 
criticism. Garcia-Parpet highlighted the importance of market crises for radical 
innovations by studying the strawberry market in Sologne (2007) and the 
French wine market (2009). Barbera et al. (2012) show how the Italian wine 
scandal of 1986 fostered and fastened the change of the Piedmont wine market 
toward more quality and authenticity. The coincidence of rising internal cri-
tique, external stimuli, and crises makes radical innovations particularly likely. 
Focusing on the relation between institutions and conventions and the cri-
tique and satisfaction with the functioning of institutions, Diaz-Bone (2012, 71-2) 
outlines four situations of what we call here “market regimes.” We use this as a 
heuristic to explain market stability and dynamic. The first situation is „normal-
ity”: Institutions are judged as functioning and they are coherent with the con-
ventions. This is the most harmonic situation and identical with our theoretical 
concept of stable market regimes.  
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The second situation is “blockage/hegemony.” Actors view institutions as 
not functioning, however, there is still at least one convention in coherence 
with the institution(s). Actors relate to the institution in their actions and thus 
coordination is based on the institution, however, they “experience both as not 
matching with their collective interest. Then critique will be mobilized” (Diaz-
Bone 2012, 71). This stage is the normal case. Hardly any established market 
regime is unquestioned. Actors in disadvantaged market positions and idealistic 
outsiders often criticize the status quo. As criticism is usually considered as the 
moan of the “losers” and “weirdos” by the majority of market participants, 
criticism fails to attract enough followers to overturn the market regime. 
Hence, in the second stage advocates of the established market regimes are able 
to repel attacks and to maintain the status quo. 
Critics of situation two die out (the system returns to situation one), remain 
weak, segregated, and local. Or criticism accelerates and spreads and the chal-
lenger camp succeeds in overturning the established market regime (the system 
transfers into situation three or four). Diaz-Bone (2012, 72) defines situation 
three as (silent) “dynamic/change” (because there is no critique of the failure of 
institutions) and four as “crisis/failure” where institutions are seen as failing 
and there is no backing of institutions by any convention(s). Important is that 
situation three and four are “transitory and unstable” (Diaz-Bone 2012, 72). 
The two stages are a time of radical innovations. Former market regimes, with 
coherent conventions and institutions, break up by conventional or institutional 
change, but no new market regimes with coherent conventions and institutions 
develops. As a new market regime of coherent conventions and institutions 
establishes itself, the system returns to situation one or two, the time of radical 
innovation is completed and stability restores. 
Two main processes shift markets from situation two to situation three and 
four. First, accelerating and spreading critique. Goldstone and Useem (2012) 
criticized Fligstein and McAdam for being over focused on the criticism from 
those with lower field position and therefore overlooking that successful revo-
lutions are often led by high status actors. As outlined above the market re-
gimes’ inability to reduce uncertainty and facilitate coordination and coopera-
tion, rise of new ideas, market crises, bad expectations for the market’s future, 
and several external factors may spread criticism beyond groups usually critical 
of the established order and cause even market leaders to join the challenger 
camp. Challengers question and reject the appropriateness of the dominant 
conventions and/or the institutional setting. Shifts of the dominant conventions 
and institutional frame due to internal critique break up the established market 
regime. Second, exogenous, often institutional, changes, like the implementa-
tion of new transnational laws, break up the market regime. Hence stage three 
and four are transitory and unstable and arise from shifts in conventions or 
institutions. However, the two stages are characterized by much uncertainty, 
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disturbance, conflict, and chaos. During transitory times, the future is principal-
ly open; actors compete and negotiate over conventions, institutions, and mar-
ket positions.  
However, if “market revolutions” are successful and new stable market re-
gimes are established the change has far reaching consequences for all groups 
of market participants and the underlying market structure. The radical innova-
tions fundamentally shifts “what the purpose of the field [market] is, what 
positions the actors occupy, what the rules of the game are, and how actors 
come to understand what others are doing” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 12). 
Radical innovation suspends the old quality ascription, the old rankings, and 
the old distribution of market opportunities. Quality, value, the ranking of 
products, the status of producers, consumers, and intermediaries and the distri-
bution of market opportunities, all is matter for negotiation. Overall, the whole 
system of desired and undesired, valuable and worthless, good and bad may 
break down and has to be renegotiated. 
5.  Method3 
There exist only a handful of empirical studies concerned with the dynamics of 
markets. Most of the already discussed empirical work deals indirectly with 
market change. Therefor we had a strong orientation towards a method that 
puts openness for new and surprising findings at its center and at the same time 
allows a certain degree of existing theoretical concepts to be incorporated into 
the research. The orientation of the empirical work was therefore towards 
Grounded Theory (GT) (Strauss 2010 [1987]; Strauss and Corbin 1990). GT 
techniques like open and axial coding were used primarily to analyze the quali-
tative data and secondly to enable openness to come up with new and surpris-
ing discoveries. The empirical project was focused on qualitative expert inter-
views with individuals associated with the regional wine market in Styria. 
Twelve structured interviews were conducted, while the sampling approach 
followed a snowball strategy.  
Table 1: List of Interviews 
 Type of organization Interview No. 
Mass media Regional daily newspaper I2 
Wine magazine 
National magazine I11 
Regional magazine I12 
State institutions Chamber of agriculture I1 
                                                             
3  The data was mostly collected by Luka Jakelja. 
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Regional professional school I6 
Producer  
association 
Internationally oriented producer association (4 member) I3 
Regional producer association I (250 members) I5 
Regional producer association II (10 members) I7 
Regional producer association III (7 members) and IV (75 
members) I8 
Regional producer association V (31 members) I10 
Regional producer association of “BIO” producers VI (5 
members) I9 
Entrepreneur Wine exporter; former CEO of a national wine association I4 
 
Data coding and analysis was done with Atlas.ti. After 12 interviews, a clear 
saturation was evident in the data, and most important organizations for the 
analyzed market were covered with these interviews. 
6. The Dynamics of Market Regimes on the Austrian 
Wine-Market 
In the following part, we present and discuss the results of our empirical re-
search. We start in the 1970s, where the market convention was dominant. We 
then discuss the dawning of the domestic convention and thereby the beginning 
of a new market regime. In 1985, a crisis hit and lent further dynamics to the 
already shaken market. In the post-crisis period, the domestic convention be-
came dominant on the market and established a new market regime.  
6.1 The “Old” Market Regime: The Dominance of the Market 
Convention 
In the 1970s and 1980s, wine was a consumption good in the region of interest. 
Both supply and demand followed this logic. In the understanding of the con-
sumer, wine had similar characteristics to butter or bread. Wine was “staple 
food” (I11), a “most basic consumption commodity” (I5) which is why con-
sumers expected low prices, comparable to other basic staple goods. Conse-
quently, no criteria of differentiation (e.g., grape variety or “terroir”) between 
different wines existed. The taste of the consumers was oriented towards 
“sweetness,” indicating ripe grapes as the basic product of the wine. From the 
non-existing differentiation between quality and the uniformity regarding the 
expected taste of the product, it followed that prices were the decisive coordi-
nation mechanism on the markets. Wine producers supplied a product that had 
to “taste reasonably good” (I5), while focusing on low production costs and 
extended quantities. “[T]he wine culture was at a low level” (I6). Hence, the 
market convention was dominant (see Diaz-Bone 2018, 148-9 for the market 
convention). Cost-minimization and profit-maximization – as being part of 
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every microeconomics textbook – were the guiding principles of wine producers. 
The situation was one where a homogenous product meets an extensive de-
mand, while supply and demand are regulated by the equilibrium price.  
Post-World War II, the agriculture of the studied region was dominated by 
subsistence farming; farmers lived from the products of their small yards. 
Through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s agriculture became more market orien-
tated, but still quite small (the average producer had about 0.5 hectares of land). 
Due to low prices and small vineyards winemakers could hardly live on their 
products. As a consequence farmers gave up their business, farms found no 
replacements, and many small farmers had a rather squalid existence. Others 
bought up yards, but could also hardly live on their products. Due to the huge 
competition and low prices wine producers sought to cut production costs to 
stay competitive and successful. In this context, a growing number of producers 
became discontent with the situation and had quite gloomy expectations of 
their business future. 
6.2  Spreading Criticism and the Rise of the Outlaws 
The Styrian wine market faced two main problems. First, as outlined, due to 
low prices and small yards wine producers could hardly live on their products. 
Second, the Styrian soil was quite disadvantageous to produce what was de-
manded: sweet, broad, and full-bodied wines. Discontent with low prices and 
the preferred taste so hard to produce in the area motivated a small group of 
winemakers to do things in a completely new way. The acuteness of the situa-
tion led to cooperation between a group of winemakers who were all part of the 
same peer group, went to school together, and lived in close distance to each 
other (I7). Even though the individual producers understood that the main issue 
on the market was the quality of the product, individualistic action was too 
risky because of the contradicting trend in taste of the consumers and standard 
production technique. Therefore, in this first phase of the development of a new 
market regime, cooperative criticism was taking place. The pre-existing friend-
ships between these producers paved the way not only for cooperation in gen-
eral but also for a process of mutual learning about quality wine making. This 
process was induced and maintained by a key individual. 
The group of young winemakers had a “mentor” (I11), who himself was not 
in the wine business but was a “wine freak” (I1). Only by the efforts of this 
“outsider” and because of his charisma and enthusiasm for wine, the “core 
group” (I1) learned how quality was defined in internationally recognized wine 
hotspots and how this quality was achieved. All interviews of our sample men-
tion the significance of this individual for the development of the regional wine 
market. This mentor was “collecting” international quality wines and brought 
these to weekly wine-tastings of the group. “[H]e was one who really knew 
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something about wine. He had understood something [about wine]” (I11), 
which led to visionary ideas and unconventional practices. One of the inter-
viewees goes so far as to call him “crazy” (I1) with a positive connotation. The 
charisma of this individual motivated and inspired the whole group of wine-
makers to leave the old paths and to be radically innovative.  
This situation is what Diaz-Bone (2012, 72) calls a “revolutionary strategy,” 
where there is no open critique of the existing structures, however, a shift of 
conventions is under way within a specific group on the market. The person of 
the mentor might appear in this context as a Schumpeterian entrepreneur flout-
ing the dominant convention (Dequech 2003). However, the empirical material 
does not contain the exact social mechanisms concerning the mentor by which 
this “silent change” happened.  
Another crucial aspect is imitation. Facilitated – not thought – by the men-
tor, the learning process was actually concentrating on imitating international 
quality. Therefore not only wine tasting was a crucial part, but also trips to 
different wine regions and international wine fairs with a high reputation. Trips 
meant that the small group of young “wine-revolutionaries” went out on winter 
weekends with the nine-seater bus of the mentor to the wine producing hot 
spots of central Europe. As an example, the first barrique in the region was the 
result of such a trip to France. All these aspects together lead to the gradual 
establishment of a new wine style and a new quality orientation within the 
small group. The practice of imitation reflects the theory of mimetic behavior 
as outlines by Orléan (2014), which we discuss above.  
The Styrian soil and climate, this is the narrative today, is quite disadvanta-
geous for sweet wines. Therefore, the young pioneers tried to establish a com-
pletely new style of wine, which met the international quality standards, but 
was in sharp contrast to the tastes of mainstream consumers and producers.  
One of the pioneers of the Styrian wine said: “It must be possible to place a 
dry wine on the market. And this was, like so often, a classic innovation and it 
was a bit irritating for the market […]” (I1, italics by the authors). 
Meeting new standards of the international wine hot spots, those pioneers 
faced much rejection at home. The new dry wines highly “irritated” (I1) con-
sumers and caused attacks and particularly “mockery” (I1) from most colleges. 
Even if most winemakers and intermediaries were unsatisfied with the status 
quo many invested heavily in techniques, distribution channels, and wine 
courses of the established market regimes. This is why they, nevertheless, 
rejected the radical innovation. Hence, the young “wine revolutionaries” were 
the outlaws on the market. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Styrian wine market as a whole was in 
stage two. The established market regime, which was dominated by the market 
convention increasingly faced criticism of market participants. Winemakers 
criticized that prices were too low to live on wine production and that the future 
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of the Styrian wine market seemed quite dark. However, at the same time the 
young pioneers or “wine-revolutionaries” who tried to establish a new market 
regime faced much mockery, rejection, and even hostility. There was much 
criticism; however, the critics failed to develop and unite behind an alternative 
market regime. 
As we elaborated in the theoretical part of this paper, critique is one of the 
central mechanisms of change in the EC. As became evident from the empirical 
material presented so far, critique was primarily directed towards the situation 
of the market as a whole, but even more importantly towards quality of the 
product.  
6.3  The 1985 Crises and the Rise of the Domestic Convention 
Winemakers followed different strategies to cope with the difficult situation. 
As mentioned, some looked for alternatives, most continued as before or 
stopped business and a small minority started to use illegal practices to cut 
costs and artificially increase the quality of their wine. The detection of the 
illegal practices caused Austria’s deepest and most serious wine scandal and 
crisis. 
The crisis hit the Austrian wine markets in 1985 as the media report of dis-
covered “falsified” wine that was dedicated for export to Germany. The biased 
wine contained a chemical named diethylene glycol. The effect was that the 
taste of the wine was “more full-bodied, thicker and stronger” (I1). The added 
chemical altered the taste in a way that “[the] wine tasted like late vintage, 
sweet wines, broad, full-bodied wines, low acidity wines” (I1). This was an 
adaptation to the common taste trend of the demand side of the market, while at 
the same time it reduced costs for producers. The Austrian wine scandal even 
reached the U.S. (The New York Times 1985) and the reputation of the whole 
country’s wine was destroyed. The overall process of crisis management is 
described as “absolutely unprofessional” (I4). In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that it was not only a crisis in regard to a loss of reputation; the used 
chemicals were believed to have negative effects on health. While in Austria no 
documented cases of health issues in connection with the modified wine oc-
curred, in Italy there was a scandal too, where people died because of chemi-
cals in the wine. The media constructed a scandal that appeared to the public of 
much wider scope than it actually had; the media reports were “excessively 
exaggerated” (I11). 
Consequently, the demand plummeted and suddenly the whole supply side 
faced potential bankruptcy. The most important consequence stemming from 
the wine scandal was a substantial loss of trust on the side of consumers. Trust 
relationships can be seen as two-sided, consisting of trust givers and trust tak-
ers, while the trust taker’s self-portrayal has a performative effect on the trust 
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relationship (Beckert 2002). In this sense the rebuilding of trust on the Austrian 
wine market can be interpreted as a process of a collective self-portrayal of 
winemakers. “[T]he reputation was broken” (I11), not only for certain produc-
ers of wine who have been involved in the illegal practices, but for the whole 
supply side of the market. Hence, with the wine scandal the established market 
regime completely failed to reduce uncertainty and facilitate cooperation and 
coordination. In this situation the criticism on the market regime reached all 
market participants. The scandal was “a shock, […] an impulse” (I5) that trig-
gered a reaction where “[…] everyone said: okay, we have to move towards 
quality and nothing else anymore” (I3).  
At this point it is interesting to note that the empirical material shows how 
the processes of justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) and quality inter-
pretation can be brought together as done by Eymard-Duvernay (2002). As 
noted by Favereau et al. (2002), Eymard-Duvernay (2002) translates the theory 
of justice by Boltanski and Thévenot into a theory of qualities where quality is 
justified by an interpretative process based on different conventions (to which 
Boltanski and Thévenot refer as “worlds”).  
One reaction to the wine scandal was that political bodies introduced the 
“world’s strictest wine law” and promoted it in an international campaign. The 
far-reaching institutional change ultimately broke up the old market regime of 
quite lax regulation and the dominant market convention. Unlike the former 
regulation, which facilitated large scale production, the new wine law favored 
small, high quality, and artisanal production (Brüders 1999). In addition to the 
new institutional frame, the socially constructed quality changed fundamental-
ly. As mentioned before, prior to the wine scandal “sweetness” was considered 
as the main quality characteristic, due to the wine scandal sweetness became 
the taste of fraud. The “sour” taste, which in the beginning of the 1980s was 
laughed at and considered to be “out,” became only some five years later a 
characteristics of a pure, unaltered quality wine. Mistrusting the entire wine 
market consumers needed signals and signs that ensured them that the wine 
was pure and unaltered. Because the added chemicals’ effect on the wine was a 
sweeter taste, the “sour” taste of the wine indicated that the product was unal-
tered and pure and could be consumed without concerns. As one interviewee 
said: “Sourness became the taste of truth” (I1). 
Even before the wine scandal disrupted the wine market, pioneers mostly 
from the group around the mentor started to use alternative ways and technolo-
gies of production. Intensifying handwork, applying traditional crafts and the 
experiences from their trips abroad, the young wine-revolutionaries became the 
early pioneers of the domestic convention.  
The wine scandal accelerated the spread of the domestic convention. Per-
sonal contacts between producers and consumers and traditional production 
counterbalanced mistrust and uncertainty about the quality of the wine. In this 
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manner the domestic convention gradually replaced the market convention as 
the dominant convention. 
A new type of consumer emerges as the domestic convention spreads. The 
process described above is the change of wine from a commodity to a product 
of culture. It is the reinvention of a century long heritage and cultural meaning 
of wine. Within the domestic convention wine as a product becomes more and 
more complex as it regains the status of a cultural good. This also means that a 
culture of consuming wine evolves. A mutual agreement regarding quality was 
established between the supply and demand sides. Consumers “followed” (I1) 
the new style and taste of the wine and they “slowly trusted us that there was 
something in the bottle or glass that was honest” (I1). This trust turns into a 
trend (I12) and a new evaluation of quality is successively established. 
With the rise of the domestic convention and the implementation of the new 
wine law, the landscape of Styrian wine intermediaries took shape fundamen-
tally. In the period between the wine scandal and the late 1990s, the develop-
ment of the wine market goes hand in hand with the development of market 
intermediaries. Particularly central for the development of the Styrian wine 
market was the rise of the wine-media. Pivotal for the rise of the domestic 
convention and the new orientation towards quality was the reporting of a 
regional newspaper. Wine magazines are crucial for quality wine markets on a 
national and an international level, however, at the regional level certain inter-
ests of the mentioned regional newspaper and of the producer association of 
winemakers overlap. The regional newspaper operates in a competitive envi-
ronment where its survival depends on the construction of a regional identity. 
Wine is a lifestyle product that reflects this identity and serves this interest (I2). 
In the 1990s the newspaper started to organize wine events, which became 
networking opportunities where cultural, political, and economic elites come 
together. Still, the event is also a vehicle to promote Styrian winemakers: 
[…] this was a story, which we made together [winemakers and the newspa-
per]. […] We were somehow the boost – if you will – in the media. […] The 
message of the Styrian wine was promoted in this way. And because of that 
we always invite VIPs to the events, who are not wine experts […]. These 
people carry on and spread the message of the Styrian wine, because they 
would buy it. As I said, it’s about the multiplication effect. (I2) 
The regional newspaper explained to a wide audience the story about the wine 
market’s transformation: the time of cheap mass production was over and re-
gionality, quality, traditions, handcraft, artisan excellence matters more than 
quantity and price. Organizing wine festivals and making stories about excel-
lent Styrian wine, the newspaper convinced people that for high quality wine 
one needs not to drive far. 
In addition to the regional newspaper, the vocational school for winemaking 
and the chamber of agriculture were particularly important for the implementa-
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tion of the new market regime. Soon the vocational school for winemaking 
recognized the signs of the time and replaced courses teaching wine production 
under the market convention by courses showing techniques compatible with 
the domestic convention. The reorientation of the vocational school for wine-
making was important in two main ways. First, because most Styrian wine 
producers attended this school, most young winemakers got in contact with the 
new style of wine production. Second, the education in the school became a 
widely known and understood signal for high quality wine making. Still today 
most winemakers use their diploma as an advertisement. The chamber of agri-
culture’s relatively early support for the new market regime was pivotal in 
several ways: First, they induced many institutional changes underpinning the 
domestic convention like laws supporting the new convention, providing distri-
bution channels compatible with the domestic convention, etc. Second, they 
used their wide networks of producers and intermediaries to encourage the new 
convention. 
What we can see here is the mutual transformation of conventions and insti-
tutions as outlined in the framework of Diaz-Bone (2012) and some additional 
points in regard of “material” and “ideal” arguments for critique, innovation 
practices, and external factors (like external shocks to the market).  
7.  Conclusion 
The starting point of our contribution is the daily life empirical observation that 
markets are usually relatively stable, but occasionally fundamentally change. 
Our main aim is to develop a heuristic of market stability and change using the 
central concepts of the economics of convention. 
We introduce the notion of market regimes as market specific constellations 
of institutions and conventions. Distinguishing normal from radical innovations 
we divided the former as innovations within the boundaries of the market re-
gime and the latter as shifts of the market regimes. Established market regimes 
facilitate coordination, cooperation, reduce uncertainty and unequally distributed 
market opportunities among actors. Market participants, in particular market 
leaders, have good reasons to protect the dominant market regime. 
However, occasionally radical innovators succeed in overcoming the forces 
of conservativism and establishing a new market regime. Most of the time a 
small clique of radical innovators exists, which usually fails to overturn the 
status quo. Several factors make radical innovations more likely, which may 
include a growing dissatisfaction and critique – resulting both from unequal 
material endowments as well as form differing ideal convictions – of under-
privileged actors of a given market regime and/or external factors of change 
and/or market crisis. The first point addresses internal dynamics, as critique 
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arises from alternative and conflicting conventions. Regarding the second 
point, there is a wide range of what we call “external factors.” These may in-
clude general changes of laws and regulations affecting the market (institutional 
change) and influences by other markets (like spillovers of conventions or 
crisis on complementary markets). Those three aspects are usually connected: 
Critique might gain momentum if external or internal crises shake the existing 
market regime. Emerging conventions (from other neighboring fields) might 
also be a stimulating factor for intensified critique. At the same time, critique 
might only start to form if opposing conventions arise or a crisis hits the market. 
In addition, we used the empirical example of the Styrian wine market to 
make our point clearer. In the 1970s and early 1980s the wine market was 
characterized by the dominance of the market convention and the institutional 
underpinning of the convention. Low prices and the unprofitability of wine 
production caused much criticism of the status quo. Poor perspectives caused a 
group of young winemakers, supported by a charismatic mentor, to move out to 
the wine hotspots of Europe. Inspired by alternative techniques of the wine 
hotspots the clique started to make wine in quite different ways. However, 
despite of the unfavorable situation on the wine market, the young “wine revo-
lutionaries” faced much rejection from the establishment, which invested 
heavily in the market convention. Not until the severe wine crises of the mid-
1980s did the Styrian “wine revolutionists” gain momentum and were able to 
overturn the resistance.  
The crises convinced most winemakers and intermediaries that something 
had to change fundamentally and significantly shifted the taste of Styrian wine 
consumers. To restore trust winemakers shifted toward the domestic conven-
tion: by direct contact with consumers and the use of artisanal techniques 
winemakers increasingly distanced themselves from the former market conven-
tion, which caused the crises. In addition, the rising domestic convention was 
underpinned by a new wine law. Intermediaries like wine schools and a local 
newspaper also were pivotal for the implementation of the domestic conven-
tion. Hence several interconnected factors facilitated the radical innovation 
within the Styrian wine market: Young “wine revolutionaries” brought new 
techniques, as alternatives to the used once, to the region. Low profits and 
prices caused much dissatisfaction among winemakers. The wine crises accel-
erated and spread criticism and caused a widely shared agreement on the neces-
sity of fundamental change. Intermediaries’ active support of the new market 
regime and consumers shifting preferences were also pivotal for the implemen-
tation of the domestic convention.  
In the initial market convention, the fraud of some market participants is a 
crucial element of change. It illustrates that the theoretical concepts of justice 
and justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) play an important role in the 
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process of the interpretation and evaluation of the qualities of things based on 
conventions. This is something that is usually difficult to show. 
The empirical part shows how the previously derived theoretical heuristics 
of market regimes and the relation between institutions and conventions on 
markets can be expanded to include explanations of changing conventions on 
markets, primarily triggered by critique. We could show that markets are most-
ly stable and only occasionally change radically. However, it remains an open 
question to what extend our results apply to other markets as well. The Styrian 
market for pork for example, was hit by similarly severe crises but did not 
experience the kind of dynamics the wine market did. Nevertheless, the theo-
retical heuristics of the EC proves to be a robust framework for the analysis of 
market dynamics. 
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